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Abstract
Research on the structure of dialogue has
been hampered for years because large di-
alogue corpora have not been available.
This has impacted the dialogue research
community’s ability to develop better the-
ories, as well as good off-the-shelf tools
for dialogue processing. Happily, an in-
creasing amount of information and opin-
ion exchange occur in natural dialogue in
online forums, where people share their
opinions about a vast range of topics. In
particular we are interested in rejection
in dialogue, also called disagreement and
denial, where the size of available dia-
logue corpora, for the first time, offers
an opportunity to empirically test theo-
retical accounts of the expression and in-
ference of rejection in dialogue. In this
paper, we test whether topic-independent
features motivated by theoretical predic-
tions can be used to recognize rejection in
online forums in a topic-independent way.
Our results show that our theoretically mo-
tivated features achieve 66% accuracy, an
improvement over a unigram baseline of
an absolute 6%.
1 Introduction
Research on the structure of dialogue has been
hampered for years because large dialogue corpora
have not been publicly available. This has im-
pacted the dialogue research community’s ability
to develop better theories, as well as good off-the-
shelf tools for dialogue processing that account for
the richness of human dialogue. Happily, an in-
creasing amount of information and opinion ex-
change occurs in natural dialogue in online fo-
rums, where people can express their opinion on
a vast range of topics from Should there be more
stringent gun laws? to Are school uniforms a good
idea? (Walker et al., 2012a). For example, con-
sider the dialogic exchange in Fig. 1.
Post P, Response R
P1: Can the government force abortion clinics to carry
anti-abortion articles and papers? Or maybe force them
provide a sonogram? Force them to have a psychologist
on staff? Force them to have 3x3 foot posters of aborted
babies on the wall? Seems like it makes more sense for a
state to restrict something from the people rather than force
the people to have something. No?
R1: I don’t see why this matters. Could you please elab-
orate a little more, and in that elaboration, could you ad-
dress why the government may require a private company
to provide this commonly recommended medical remedy
(plan b) when it does not do so with countless other com-
mon medically recommended remedies?
Figure 1: Disagreement from 4forums.com. Pos-
sible features in bold.
In particular we are interested in the phe-
nomenon of REJECTION in dialogue (Horn, 1989;
Walker, 1996a), also called disagreement and de-
nial. Our data show that the amount of disagree-
ment in online ideological dialogues ranges from
80% to 90% across topic. Such data provides a
rich resource for testing theoretical accounts of re-
jection, as well as for developing computational
models of how to recognize rejection in dialogue.
To date, rejection has received relatively little at-
tention in computational models of discourse be-
cause of its rareness in task-oriented, tutorial or
SwitchBoard style dialogue. Computational mod-
els of argumentative discourse do not typically at-
tempt to account for rejection in dialogue, focus-
ing instead on monologic sources displaying legal
reasoning, logical accounts of rejection, or how to
produce good arguments using natural language
generation (Zukerman et al., 2000; Carenini and
Moore, 2000; Wiley, 2005; Sadock, 1977).
Moreover, the theoretical literature strongly
suggests that there should be topic-independent in-
dicators of rejection. In work on politeness the-
ory, rejection is a dispreferred response, predict-
ing that rejection should be associated with mark-
ers of dispreferred responses such as disfluencies
and hedging (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Work
on negation specifies markers of negation and con-
trast such as but or only for different types of re-
jection, and work on discourse relations and their
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Type Context Rejection
DENIAL Pigs can fly. No, you idiot, pigs can’t fly! (Horn’s 29)
LOGICAL CONTRADICTION Kim and Lee have been partners since
1989.
But Lee said they met in 1990.
IMPLICIT DENIAL Julia’s daughter is a genius. Julia doesn’t have any children.
REFUSAL Come and play ball with me. No, I don’t want to. (Horn’s 33)
IMPLICATURE REJECTION There’s a man in the garage. There’s something in the garage. (Walker’s 6)
DENYING BELIEF TRANSFER B: Well ah he uh ... he belongs to a
money market fund now and uh they
will do that for him. H: The money
market fund will invest it in govern-
ment securities as part of their individ-
ual retirement account – is that what
you’re saying? B: Right.
H: I’m not so sure of that. (Walker’s 31)
INCONSISTENT PAST BELIEF H: Then they are remiss in not sending
it to you because that money is taxable
sir.
M: I know it’s taxable, but I thought they
would wait until the end of the 30 months.
CITING CONTRADICTORY
AUTHORITY
H: No sir.... R: That’s what they told me.
Figure 2: Classification and Examples of the Types of Rejections.
markers suggests that DENIAL is a type of COM-
PARISON relation (Horn, 1989; Groen et al., 2010;
Webber and Prasad, 2008). These observations,
among others, suggest a range of theoretically mo-
tivated features for the classification of rejection in
online dialogue, e.g. phrases such as I think, but, I
don’t see, and Can you. See Fig. 1.
Our aim is to test whether theoretical predic-
tions and topic-independent features motivated by
them can be used to recognize rejection in online
forums. We generalize our topic independent fea-
tures using a development set on the topic Evolu-
tion. We then test a rejection (disagreement) clas-
sifier trained on Evolution on 1757 posts covering
a collection of other topics, and compare our re-
sults to a ngram model trained on Evolution and
tested on the same test set. See Table 1.
We first describe our corpus in Sec. 2, and then
review previous work characterizing the theoreti-
cal basis of rejection in dialogue in Sec. 3. Sec. 4
describes our method for classifying rejections
and Sec. 5 presents our results, showing that our
theoretically motivated rejection cues are reliable
across topic. We show that cue words, polarity,
punctuation, denial and claim features motivated
by the theoretical literature provide a significant
improvement over a 50% baseline, and that all
of the theoretically motivated features combined
achieve 66% accuracy as compared to a unigram
accuracy of 60%. We delay reviewing previous
computational work rejection to Sec. 6 when we
can compare it with our own work.
2 Corpus
We utilize the publicly available Internet Ar-
gument Corpus (IAC), an annotated collec-
Topic Agr DisAgr Total
Evolution 460 460 920
Abortion 250 280 530
Climate Change 17 10 27
Communism vs. Capitalism 10 13 23
Death Penalty 15 19 34
Existence Of God 53 48 101
Gay Marriage 173 134 307
Gun Control 334 331 665
HealthCare 21 37 58
Marijuana Legalization 6 6 12
All Topics (test set) 879 878 1757
Table 1: Distribution of (Dis)Agreement by Topic.
The Evolution topic is for development and train-
ing. The test set of other topics is balanced overall,
but not by topic.
tion of 109,553 forum posts (11,216 discussion
threads)(Walker et al., 2012a). We use the
portion of the IAC containing dialogues from
http://4forums.com. On 4forums, a person
starts a discussion by posting a topic or a question
in a particular category, such as society, politics,
or religion. Forum participants can then post their
opinions, choosing whether to respond directly to
a previous post or to the top level topic (start a
new thread). Conversants may simply agree or dis-
agree with a previous post or they may provide a
reasoned argument.
The corpus contains posts on topics such as
Abortion, Evolution, Existence of God, Gay Mar-
riage and Gun control along with a range of use-
ful annotations. First, there are annotations that
collapse different discussions into a single topic
for 14 topics. For example, the Evolution and
Gun Control topics include discussions initiated
with the range of titles in Table 2, which guaran-
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First Post (P), Response (R)
Disagreements
P1: No I didn’t miss it, I was hoping you’d actually put forward an argument against what I said, not what you think I
said. See what I actually said was the tautology. Then make your argument. Note Post 30 He said evolution is a tautology.
I said that Darwin preferred a tautology to “Natural Selection” You may have mixed up who it is you’re arguing against.
R1: I’m wondering. What do we call someone who debates feverishly on scientific theories, yet admittedly does not
understand the concepts they are arguing against? Is it productive to debate something that you don’t understand
the concepts of when it’s a fairly involved theory based on scientific evidence? What if you convinced someone NOT
to believe in it, but you did so using falsifiable reasons, since you aren’t an expert and might not know any better?
Irresponsible, is one such word, that comes to mind.
P2: What in Vishnu’s name does this have ANYTHING to do with evolution vs creation???
R2: Well, many have argued that if you don’t except a literal Genesis, you’re damned. Perhaps not in this particular
thread, but the arguments are essentially the same. I believe that the theological implications of that position are fair
game for discussing the validity of creationism.
P4: You have this backwards. The word theory was originally a scientific word, and then it was adapted into common
speech to mean a range of things not originally designated to that word. Words like evolve, gravity and congruent have
different meanings within the realm of science than they have outside. If you can’t appreciate the difference between
the definition of a word in the context of science as opposed to the context of common speech, then maybe you have no
business in science.
R4: When it comes to all the examples that Behe had provided in both his first book, and his second book , it has been
shown to be able to evolve naturally. That means, in principle, IC systems can evolve. If you don’t believe so, bring forth
the I.C. system of your choice. To say ‘you don’t know all the answers’ is just the logical fallacy known as ’argument
from ignorance’. Behe brings a system up that he claims is IC. the pathway for evolution is discovered, and Behe trys
another one. How dishonest can you get? The concept is falsified.
P5: Well, Genesis has God making all the animals “and their kind”, and then when he’s done with that he makes humans.
So I would assume that humans don’t fit into the “kind” schema, or perhaps are a kind unto themselves........
R5: : So we can’t base our definition of “kind” on mere appearances? I mean if we are going to put things into
categories and call the category “kind”, we should do this by common appearances. A penguin is in the same kind as a
hummingbird, but is a lobster in the same kind as an oyster? ........
Agreements
P6: I think its nonsense interpretation developed by people who were afraid that if they fought for guns as valiantly as
they did for free speech, they wouldn’t receive any donations.
R6: I think you are entirely correct. From the page VOR linked: There is no evidence ANYWHERE that the second
amendment is a collective right. We have been over this multiple times, and the evidence simply does not exist, and an
organization like the ACLU should be well aware of this.
P7: Correction: If one isn’t a fundementalist, literal christian, jew or muslim, then marc considers them a atheist. He’s
never going to deal with the fact that he’s quite wrong on that subject. It’s obvious to everyone that he’s constantly
avoiding it even when asked point blank several times. A sign of argumental failure is constant avoidance of a simple
question.
R7: Quite right. My mistake. Once again, quite right...
P8: thats pretty neat. Did they finish up the feeder?
R8: yeah, this is clearly the best thread on these forums in probably the past year....give us some more pics length)
P9: This is probably the most rational site in all of the creationist’s online arguments. Arguments we think creationists
should NOT use
R9: Thanks, DuoMax, for this link. How delightful to see here mention of this solid gesture, on the part of a major
creationist organization, in the direction of intellectual integrity..... ....Each time a Christian stands in the pulpit and pours
out poor argument, s/he loses ground for the faith. Thanks again.
Figure 3: Disagreements and Agreements from 4forums.com. Theoretically motivated features are in
bold.
Evolution Evolution in school, Dinosaurs and Hu-
man Footprints, Can Evolution & Reli-
gion Coexist, Did Charles Darwin Re-
cant, Shrinking Sun, Bombardier beetle,
Moon Dust, Second Law of Thermody-
namics, Magnetic Field, Nebraska Man
Gun Control Gun Control, Trigger Locks, Guns in the
Home, Right to Carry, Assault Weapons,
One gun a month, Gun Buy Back, Gun-
Seizure Laws, Plastic Guns, Does gun
ownership deter crime, Second Amend-
ment, Enforced Gun Control Laws?,
Gun Registration, Armor piercing bul-
lets, Background Checks at Gun Shows
Table 2: Discussions Mapped to the Evolution and
Gun Control Topics.
tees variation in the focus of the discussion even
within topic. The topics we use are in Table 1.
Each discussion is threaded so that we can iden-
tify direct responses. Discussions may have a tree-
like structure, so a post may have multiple di-
rect responses. In addition to the adjacency pairs
yielded by threading, 4forums also provides a
quote/response Q/R mechanism where a post may
include a quote of part or all of a previous post.
We do not use the Q/R pairs here.
The IAC also includes annotations collected via
Mechanical Turk on these dialogue pairs. There
are 20,000 pairs from threads of 3 posts P1,P2,P3
with annotations for (dis)agreement for pairs (P1,
P2) and (P2, P3). Agreement was a scalar judg-
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ment on an 11 point scale [-5,5] implemented with
a slider. The annotators were also able to signal
uncertainty with a CAN’T TELL option. Each of
the pairs was annotated by 5-7 annotators, in re-
sponse to the annotation question Does the respon-
dent agree or disagree with the prior post?. Anno-
tators achieved high agreement on dis(agreement)
annotation with an α of 0.62. We used thresholds
of 1 and -1 on the mean agreement judgment to de-
termine agreement and disagreement respectively.
We omitted dialogue adjacency pairs with mean
annotator judgment in the (-1,1) range. Table 1
provides the distribution of topics for the 1757
posts in the test set.
3 Theories of Rejection in Dialogue
A common view of dialogue is that the conversa-
tional record is part of the COMMON GROUND of
the conversants. As conversants A and B partici-
pate in a dialogue, A and B communicate through
dialogue speech acts such as PROPOSALS, ASSER-
TIONS, ACCEPTANCES and REJECTIONS. If A
asserts a proposition φ and B accepts A’s asser-
tion, the φ becomes a mutual belief in the com-
mon ground. If B rejects A’s assertion or proposal,
the common ground remains as it was (Stalnaker,
1978). For conversants to remain coordinated
(Thomason, 1990), they must monitor whether
their utterances are accepted or rejected by their
conversational partners.
Computational models of dialogue also must
track what is in the common ground (Traum, 1994;
Stent, 2002). This would be simple if conversants
always explicitly indicated rejection with forms
such as I reject your assertion. However recog-
nizing rejection typically relies on making infer-
ences. Horn categorizes rejections into: DENIAL
a straightforward negation of the other’s assertion;
LOGICAL CONTRADICTION following from logi-
cal inference; IMPLICIT DENIAL where B denies
a presupposition of A’s; and REFUSAL, also called
REJECTION where B refuses an offer or proposal
of A’s (Horn, 1989). See Fig. 2. All of Horn’s
forms can be identified as rejections by recogniz-
ing logical inconsistency either directly from what
was said, or via an inferential chain.
However subsequent work by Walker on the
Harry Gross Corpus (henceforth HGC) of advice-
giving dialogues (Pollack et al., 1982) demon-
strated that REJECTION IMPLICATURES as seen in
the 5th row of Fig. 2, are common in natural di-
alogue (Walker, 1996a). A number of similar ex-
amples can also be found in (Hirschberg, 1985).
Here, the proposition realized by the response fol-
lows from the original assertion as an entailment
via existential generalization. Thus the REJEC-
TION IMPLICATURE is logically consistent with
the original assertion.
Walker argues that the fact that an implicature
can function as a rejection clearly indicates that
inference rules about what gets added to the com-
mon ground must have the same logical status as
implicatures, i.e. they must be default rules of
inference that can be defeated by context. She
then goes on to identify additional types of rejec-
tions in HGC that rely on detecting conflicts in
the default inferences triggered by the epistemic
inference rules used in speech act theory. Walker
uses a compressed version of rules from (Perrault,
1990; Appelt and Konolige, 1988), assuming that
conflicting defaults can arise between these in-
ferences and implicature inferences (Hirschberg,
1985). The first rule is given in 1:
(1) BELIEF TRANSFER RULE:
Say(A,B,p)→ Bel (B,p)
The Belief Transfer Rule states that if one agent
A makes an assertion that p then by default another
agent B will come to believe that p. The second
rule is in 2:
(2) BELIEF PERSISTENCE RULE:
Bel (B,p,t0)→ Bel (B,p,t1)
The Belief Persistence Rule states that if an
agent B believes p at time t0 then by default agent
B still believes p at a later time t1. These rules pro-
vide the basis for inferring three additional types
of rejections:
• DENYING BELIEF TRANSFER: Agent B can
deny the consequent of the Belief Transfer
Rule by negatively evaluating A’s assertion or
expressing doubt as to its truth.
• INCONSISTENT PAST BELIEF: Inferring that
B’s expression of an inconsistent past belief
is a type of rejection relies on detecting con-
flicting defaults with the Belief Transfer Rule
and the Belief Persistence Rule. The two be-
liefs may directly conflict, or the conflict may
arise via an inferential chain.
• CITING CONTRADICTORY AUTHORITY: In-
ferring that citing a contradictory authority
is a type of rejection relies on recognizing
two inconsistent instantiations of the Belief
Transfer rule. For example, agent A1 as-
serted p and agent A2 asserted ¬p, leaving
B in an inconsistent belief state caused by the
conflicting defaults generated by the alternate
instantiations of the Belief Transfer Rule.
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Fig. 2 provides Walker’s examples of these
new types of rejection and Fig. 3 illustrates dis-
agreements and agreements in the IAC corpus.1
While we see many instances of the rejection
types in Fig. 2 in IAC, especially CITING CON-
TRADICTORY AUTHORITY and DENYING BELIEF
TRANSFER, we also find new types such as ad-
hominem attacks on the other speaker as the
source of particular propositions (e.g. R1 in Fig. 3,
which would not have occurred in HGC talk show
context. Other cases that we have noted are a
different type of DENYING BELIEF TRANSFER,
which occurs when a previous speaker’s asserted
proposition is marked by the hearer as hypotheti-
cal using a conditional, e.g. If capital punishment
is a deterrent, then ..... In future work we aim to
expand the taxonomy of rejections using IAC.
4 Empirical Method
Our primary hypothesis is that certain expres-
sions and phrases are reliable cues to the auto-
matic identification of the speech acts of REJEC-
TION and ACCEPTANCE, i.e. (dis)agreement, in-
dependently of the topic. We assume that it will
not always be possible to get annotated data for a
particular topic, given the ever-burgeoning range
of topics discussed online. We use the Evolu-
tion topic as our development set, and ask: given
(dis)agreement annotations for only one topic, is it
possible to develop features that perform well on
another arbitrary topic?
There is limited previous research on disagree-
ment, thus it is an open issue what types of fea-
tures might be useful. One line of previous work
suggests that various pragmatic features might
help (Galley et al., 2004). Another line suggests
that disagreement is subtype of the COMPARISON
(CONTRAST) discourse relation, in the Penn Dis-
course TreeBank taxonomy, suggesting that fea-
tures for identifying COMPARISON, such as polar-
ity and discourse cues might also be useful (Hahn
et al., 2006; Prasad et al., 2010; Louis et al., 2010).
We began by selecting and manually inspecting
460 agreements and 460 disagreements from the
Evolution topic, and extracting their most frequent
unigrams, bigrams and trigrams. This showed that
features suggested by theoretical work on rejec-
tion were indeed highly frequent: our aim was
to generalize what we observed in the Evolution
dataset and then test whether the generalized fea-
tures can distinguish agreements from disagree-
ments. We first observed that very few unigrams
1Since participants are not generally making plans to-
gether in these dialogues, we leave aside Walker’s classifi-
cation of rejections of proposals.
were useful for disagreements, e.g. liar, no, don’t,
while bigrams such as I don’t, How can, If I, how
could, show me seemed to be better indicators.
Furthermore, trigrams such as I don’t agree, how
can you, point is that, and I do not understand
are even stronger indicators of disagreement, but
of course these higher order ngrams are less fre-
quent and are more likely to contain topic-specific
words. In order to provide better generalization,
we generalized the ngrams that we observed, e.g.
an instance such as how can you would also result
in how can we and how can they being added to the
same feature set. We also generalized over hedges
and other categories of features on the basis of the
theoretical literature. The total set of features we
developed are grouped into the sets in Table 3 dis-
cussed in detail below.
Feature Description Examples
Agreement Ngrams in-
dicative of
accepting
others claim.
right, yes, yeah, correct,
accepted, thanks, good,
agree, acknowledge
Cue Words Cues as Ngrams
and their LIWC
CogMech gen-
eralizations
oh, so, uh, yes, no, dont,
cogmech, claim, i, yeah,
because, well, just, and,
you, you mean, i see, i
COGMECH
Denial Ngrams indica-
tive of denying
another’s claim
You don’t know, That
does not, I don’t think,
what is, This has noth-
ing, I don’t see, You
do not, do you mean,
I don’t know, we don’t
have, Problem with
that, I do not, Does not,
why do, But I don’t,
how can
Hedges Unigrams,
bigrams, and
trigrams that
include hedge
terms.
Im wondering, I am
wondering, whatever,
somewhat, may be,
possibly, anyway, it
seems to me, my view,
actually, my opinion,
essentially, somewhat,
my perspective, rather,
although, really, I
suppose, perhaps
Duration Sentence, word and post lengths
Polarity Means of positive and negative polarity
terms.
Punctuation Counts of question marks and exclamation
points.
Table 3: Feature Sets, Descriptions, and Exam-
ples. The unigrams features are our baseline case;
these features are not theoretically motivated.
Unigrams. Results of previous work on stance
identification in argumentative discourse suggest
that a unigram baseline can be difficult to beat
(Thomas et al., 2006; Somasundaran and Wiebe,
2010). Thus we test our theoretically moti-
vated features against unfiltered unigrams and un-
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igrams+bigrams as baselines.
Agreement and Denial. As described above we
used Evolution to manually develop generaliza-
tions of the observed unigrams, bigrams and tri-
grams that were consistent with theoretical pre-
dictions. We split the indicator features into two
categories Agreement and Denial. See Table 3.
Our manual analysis suggested that agreements
have few topic independent markers. Unigrams
such as agree correct and right were also present
in disagreements, and trigrams such as I agree
but, You may be correct however I do not agree,
I don’t agree were better indicators of disagree-
ment. Our agreement markers are thus a small
category where we check that the keywords agree,
correct and right are not preceded by a negation
marker and not followed by discourse markers
such as but, yet, or however. However, the denial
category at present has more than 300 ngrams ex-
tracted and generalized from the Evolution topic.
Pitler et al, (2009) also used ngrams consisting of
the first and last three words for recognition of the
PDTB COMPARISON relation. Other work on the
PDTB also suggests that DENIAL can be indicated
by contrast (Webber and Prasad, 2008).
Cue Words. Both psychological research on dis-
course processes (Fox Tree and Schrock, 1999;
Groen et al., 2010) and computational work on
agreement and discourse markers (Galley et al.,
2004; Louis et al., 2010) indicate that discourse
markers are strongly associated with particular
pragmatic functions such as stating a personal
opinion (Asher et al., 2008; Webber and Prasad,
2008). Based on manual inspection of the Evo-
lution devset we selected 18 items for the CUE
WORDS feature set, as in Table 3. Examples are
well in R2 and so and but in R5.
Durational Features. Brown and Levinson’s the-
ory of politeness would suggest that disagree-
ments are dispreferred responses and thus that the
length of the post could indicate disagreement; it
predicts that people will elaborate more and pro-
vide reasons and justifications for disagreement
(Brown and Levinson, 1987). Our durational fea-
tures measure the length of the utterance in terms
of characters, words and sentences.
Hedges. In Brown and Levinson’s theory of po-
liteness, hedges are one of many possible strate-
gies for mitigating a face-threatening act (Brown
and Levinson, 1987; Lakoff, 1973). Hedges can be
used to be deliberately vague or simply to soften
a claim. We see many examples of hedges in on-
line dialogue, e.g. the speaker of R2 in Fig. 3 uses
the hedges Perhaps and essentially, and I mean in
R5. Thus hedges are hypothesized to be useful
feature for distinguishing (dis)agreement, yielding
the hedge features in Table 3.
Polarity. Work on discourse relations in the PDTB
also suggests that differences in polarity across
adjacent utterances might be an indicator of the
COMPARISON relation. In addition, Horn’s classes
of REJECTIONS shown in Fig. 2 all include mark-
ers of negation. Thus to capture the overall senti-
ment of the post we used the MPQA subjectivity
lexicon (Wiebe et al., 2003; Wilson et al., 2005).
Each word is POS tagged and then categorized as
strongly or weakly subjective. The positive po-
larity feature is the sum of the strongly subjective
words of positive polarity, and the negative polar-
ity feature represents the sum of strongly subjec-
tive words of negative polarity.
Punctuation. Another indication of DENYING
BELIEF TRANSFER rejections are the question
marks and exclamation marks that conversants fre-
quently use to express their disbelief and doubt
about another conversant’s claim. For example,
R1 and R5 in Fig. 3 have a high frequency of ques-
tion marks.
5 Results
Our aim was to test how well we can distinguish
agreements and disagreements in IAC using clas-
sifiers trained with theoretically motivated fea-
tures. As described above, we developed our fea-
tures by manual inspection of (dis)agreements in
920 posts on the topic Evolution. We do not train
on a mixture of topics for any feature set, includ-
ing unigrams, because we assume that in general,
new topics are always arising so there will not be
annotated data for every topic. We evaluate the
performance of all types of features on classify-
ing (dis)agreements on other topics combined. We
do not report per-topic results because our test set
baseline accuracies vary a great deal by topic as do
the size of the topic sets. See Table 1.
Features Random Forest J 48
ALL-TM 63.1 66.0
Unigram 56.6 59.8
Bigram 59.3 60.1
Table 4: Accuracies for Theoretically Motivated
Features (ALL-TM), Unigrams and Bigrams with
Random Forest and J48 Trees over a 50% base-
line. No interesting differences observed in preci-
sion and recall.
Table 3 summarizes our theoretically-motivaed
topic-independent features, and Table 4 compares
the accuracies of classifiers using these features to
unigrams and bigrams when we train on Evolu-
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tion and then test on our mixed-topic test set, using
the Weka learners for Random forest and J48 Tree.
Although unigrams and unigram+bigram achieves
approximately 60% accuracy over a 50% baseline,
paired t-tests on the result vectors show that the
differences in accuracies are statistically signifi-
cant when we compare ALL-TM features with un-
igrams and unigram+bigrams: Random Forest (p
= .004) and J48 Trees (p < .0001).
Ngram N
Feats
Acc Feats Selected
Uni 2K 62.5 understand, fail, never,
nothing, catholic, gene,
irrelevant, acceptable, show,
didn’t, geologist, creationist
Bigram 4k 62.7 ? you, do we, understand
that, ? just, really?, is based,
well said, ? did, can the, the
nature, the church, failed to,
then what
Table 5: Accuracy when fitting to test set for num-
ber of features selected for ngrams, with sample
features.
Moreover even if we optimize on the test set
by examining the variations in performance as a
function of the number of features selected, ALL-
TM still beats both unigram and unigram+bigram,
when features are selected according to ranking by
Gain Ratio. ALL-TM is significantly more accu-
rate when compared to unigrams (p = .003) best
accuracy of 62.5 with 2000 features, and better
than unigram+bigram best accuracy of 62.7 for
4000 features (p = .007). See Table 5.
More interestingly though, if we look at what
features get selected ( Table 5), we see many fea-
tures reminiscent of our theoretically motivated
features. Features highly ranked by the Gain Ra-
tio were topic-independent cues for disagreement
such as understand, fail, nothing, never and Bi-
grams such as ? how, perhaps you, would you,
never said. However there were few high ranked
unigrams and bigrams for agreement. Also note
that topic specific cues such as gene, catholic, cre-
ationist, geologist and the church are selected over
any topic-independent cues for agreement. This
corroborates our manual construction of a com-
bined denial category with more than 300 words
and a very limited agreement category.
To test which features make the most difference,
we also conducted ablation experiments (Table 6),
as well as tests with individual features (Table 7).
Table 6 shows that the CUE WORDS (p = .0008)
and PUNCTUATION features (p = .01) have the
biggest impact on performance. The decrease in
performance when ablating agreement features is
Ablated Feature Random Forest J 48
No Agreement 62.2 65.0
No Cue Words 59.1 62.1
No Denial 63.3 66.0
No Duration 63.6 66.3
No Hedges 64.2 66.5
No Polarity 64.4 66.8
No Punctuation 60.3 61.6
Table 6: Accuracy when Ablating each Theoreti-
cally Motivated Feature with Random Forest and
J48 Trees over a 50% baseline .
not statistically significant (p = .20).
Feature Acc Prec Recall
Agreement 54.4 .55 .54
Cue words 62.5 .63 .62
Denial 52.0 .54 .52
Duration 53.6 .54 .53
Hedges 50.4 .51 .50
Polarity 53.4 .53 .53
Punctuation 65.3 .65 .65
Table 7: Results for Individual Features for J48
Trees over a 50% baseline .
Since the J48 learner performs consistently bet-
ter, we restrict our comparison of individual fea-
tures in Table 7 to that learner. Table 7 shows
that PUNCTUATION and CUE WORDS features by
themselves provide significant performance im-
provements over the unigram baseline, and that
the POLARITY, AGREEMENT, DENIAL and DU-
RATION feature sets provide significant improve-
ments on their own over the majority class base-
line of 50%. A paired t-test shows these differ-
ences are significant at p =.02. To our surprise,
the HEDGE feature was not effective, and we plan
further refinements of it. These results support the
hypothesis that there are clearly markers for agree-
ment and disagreement that are suggested by the
theoretical literature and which are not topic spe-
cific.
6 Discussion and Future Work
We develop topic-independent features for classi-
fying (dis)agreement in online dialogue, and show
that we can beat an unfiltered unigram baseline
by 6%, and even beat the best feature-selection
ngram-based classifers fitted to the test set.
Features we didn’t use from previous work in-
clude word pairs as introduced by (Marcu and
Echihabi, 2002), and used subsequently by (Pitler
et al., 2009) and (Biran and Rambow, 2011). The
issue of whether word pairs are topic-dependent
has never been addressed, but the examples given
in previous work suggest that they may indicate
topic-specific comparisons. Previous work also
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suggests that context might be helpful in recog-
nizing disagreement (Walker et al., 2012b), but we
did not test the effect of context.
The most similar work to our own trains a dis-
agreement classifier for Q/R response pairs in on-
line forums (Abbott et al., 2011). Their work used
ngrams, MPQA opinion words (Stoyanov et al.,
2005), LIWC (Pennebaker et al., 2001), and a dif-
ferent dataset (Q/R instead of P1,P2 datasets), and
does not aim to develop a classifier that works
well independently of topic. Their best accuracy
is about 68% for a feature set called BothLocal
for the JRip classifier using χ2 feature selection.
BothLocal includes unigrams, bigrams, trigrams,
LIWC, punctuation, cue words, dependency fea-
tures, generalized dependency features and utter-
ance length measures, and it is unclear whether
these features are specific to topic. It is also dif-
ficult to directly compare the results because they
do not report accuracies for individual feature sets
or ablated feature experiments. For example, their
unigram accuracy of 63% includes cue words, and
is reported for training and testing on a mixture of
topics without any held-out topics.
Other work on disagreement recognition in-
cludes that of (Wang et al., 2011) who de-
scribe conditional random field model for detect-
ing (dis)agreement between speakers in English
broadcast conversations. They use sampling and
prosodic features such as pause, duration and
speech rate on an unbalanced dataset. They re-
port an increase in F-measure of 4.5% for agree-
ment and 4.7% for disagreement over a baseline of
lexical, structural, and durational features. (Hahn
et al., 2006) show that a contrast classifier im-
proves the accuracy of dis(agreement) classifica-
tion in the ICSI meetings corpus, and that their re-
sults are less affected by imbalanced data. They
improve the F-measure to .755 over a baseline
SVM with F-measure .726. (Yin et al., 2012)
use sentiment, emotion and durational features for
(dis)agreement classification in online forums, and
they show that aggregating local positions over
posts yields 3 to 4% better performance than non-
aggregating baselines.
While recognizing (dis)agreement can be use-
ful in its own right, it has also been shown to
be useful for the identification of stance (Gawron
et al., 2012; Hassan et al., 2010; Thomas et al.,
2006; Bansal et al., 2008; Murakami and Ray-
mond, 2010; Agrawal et al., 2003). Work that
focuses on the social network structure of on-
line forums as a way to improve stance classifi-
cation has either assumed that adjacent posts al-
ways disagree, or used simple rules for identify-
ing agreement based on patterns in the reply post
(Murakami and Raymond, 2010; Agrawal et al.,
2003). Previous work by Somasundaran & Wiebe
(2009, 2010) develops positive and negative argu-
ing features for the classification of stance, that
at least in motivation, resemble our denial fea-
tures . They show that arguing features are help-
ful in stance classification. Work by (Galley et
al., 2004) on detecting disagreement in meetings
corpora similarly shows that pragmatic features
are useful for detecting disagreement using mod-
els based on Bayesian Networks. (Walker et al.,
2012b) use a number of linguistic features such as
unigrams, bigrams, and repeated punctuation and
proposed a supervised model for stance classifica-
tion in online debates. Related work by (Hassan et
al., 2010) focuses on identifying the attitude of the
participants towards one another in online debates.
They relate the polarity of words to the second per-
son pronoun for classification, while related work
by (Abu-Jbara et al., 2012) uses the polarity of
expressions and named entity recognition to iden-
tify a subgroup of participants, where participants
within a subgroup are inclined to agree with one
another. Methods for stance classification in con-
gressional debates do not separately evaluate the
accuracy of (dis)agreement classification (Thomas
et al., 2006; Bansal et al., 2008; Awadallah et al.,
2010; Burfoot, 2008).
In future work, we plan to develop more de-
tailed patterns based on LIWC categories and syn-
tactic parses (Thelen and Riloff, 2002). For ex-
ample, an error analysis suggests that sometimes
two people mutually reject the proposal or claim
of a third person, e.g. How can they say that....
In such cases our classifier finds the disagreement
marker how can and classifies it as disagreement.
More detailed syntactic processing would allow us
to refine our patterns to identify particular classes
of targets such as third person vs. first person.
Similarly, here we extended patterns by hand, e.g.
generalizations over pronouns such as I can’t, we
can’t, can you, can we. In future we aim to gen-
eralize such patterns automatically using tagsets.
We expect that more general patterns should im-
prove the accuracy of the topic-independent fea-
ture sets. We also plan to carry out further annota-
tion of the IAC corpus using the classes of rejec-
tions summarized in Fig. 2 to determine whether
there are forms for indicating each type that are
not represented by our features, and to determine
the frequency across a sample of our corpus of the
different types.
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